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Abstract 
In this paper we present a method which allows attackers to covertly leak data from isolated, 
air-gapped computers. Our method utilizes the hard disk drive (HDD) activity LED which 
exists in most of today’s desktop PCs, laptops and servers. We show that a malware can 
indirectly control the HDD LED, turning it on and off rapidly (up to 5800 blinks per second) – 
a rate that exceeds the visual perception capabilities of humans. Sensitive information can be 
encoded and leaked over the LED signals, which can then be received remotely by different 
kinds of cameras and light sensors. Compared to other LED methods, our method is unique, 
because it is also covert - the HDD activity LED routinely flickers frequently, and therefore the 
user may not be suspicious to changes in its activity. We discuss attack scenarios and present 
the necessary technical background regarding the HDD LED and its hardware control. We also 
present various data modulation methods and describe the implementation of a user-level 
malware, that doesn't require a kernel component. During the evaluation, we examine the 
physical characteristics of different colored HDD LEDs (red, blue, and white) and tested 
different types of receivers: remote cameras, 'extreme' cameras, security cameras, smartphone 
cameras, drone cameras, and optical sensors. Finally, we discuss hardware and software 
countermeasures for such a threat. Our experiment shows that sensitive data can be successfully 
leaked from air-gapped computers via the HDD LED at a maximum bit rate of 4000 bit/s (bits 
per second), depending on the type of receiver and its distance from the transmitter. Notably, 
this speed is 10 times faster than the existing optical covert channels for air-gapped computers. 
These rates allow fast exfiltration of encryption keys, keystroke logging, and text and binary 
files. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the modern cyber era, attackers have proven that they can breach many organizations thought 
to be secured. They employ sophisticated social engineering methods and exploit 0-day 
vulnerabilities in order to infiltrate the target network, while bypassing defense measures such 
as intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDS/IPS), firewalls, antivirus programs, and the 
like. For that reason, when highly sensitive information is involved, so-called air-gap isolation 
is used. In air-gap isolation, a network is kept separate, physically and logically, from public 
networks such as the Internet. Air-gapped networks are commonly used in military defense 
systems, critical infrastructure, banks and the financial sector, and others industries [1] [2].  
But despite the high degree of isolation, even air-gapped network are not immune to breaches. 
In recent years it has been shown that even air-gapped networks can become compromised. In 
order to breach such networks, attackers have used complex attack vectors, such as supply chain 
attacks, malicious insiders, and social engineering. While the most well-known breach cases 
are Stuxnet [3] and agent.btz [4], other attacks have also been reported [5] [6] [3] [7] [8].    
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A. Leaking data through an air-gap 
While infiltrating air-gapped systems has been shown feasible in recent years, the exfiltration 
of data from systems without networking or physical access, or Internet connectivity is still 
considered a challenging task. Over the years, different types of air-gap covert channels (that 
is, covert channels aimed at leaking data from air-gapped computers) have been proposed. The 
electromagnetic emission from computer components is one type of covert channel that has 
been extensively studied. In this method, a malware controls the electromagnetic emission from 
computer parts, including the screen, cables, processors and other peripherals [9] [10] [11] [12] 
[13]. Leaking data over ultrasonic waves [14] [15] and via thermal manipulations [16] have 
also been studied.  
A few types of optical covert channels have been presented as well. In particular, leaking data 
via the blinks made by keyboard LEDs, or by inserting malicious hardware with controlled 
LEDs into an organization. However, these methods are not considered completely covert, 
since they can easily be detected by people who notice the anomalous LED blinking. Generally 
speaking, because optical and LED methods are considered less covert, they have not received 
as much attention from researchers. 
B. Our contribution    
In this paper we present a method that enables malware to leak data from air-gapped computers 
using the HDD activity LED which is present in nearly all desktop and laptop computers today. 
A malware can manipulate the HDD LED and control its blinking period and speed, by using 
certain HDD I/O operations, such as 'read' and 'write.' We show that arbitrary data can be 
modulated and transmitted over the optical signals.  
Compared with existing optical methods, our method is unique in five ways: 
 Covertness. Until now, leaking data through PC LEDs has not been considered covert – 
given the irregular and inconstant nature of the blinking of keyboard and screen power 
LEDs, hence leaking data through these LEDs can be easily detected. In contrast, our 
method is considered covert, because unlike the keyboard and screen LEDs, HDD activity 
LEDs are frequently active, and manipulations of the blinking timing and speed may not 
draw special attention.  
 Speed. Our measurements show that the HDD LED can be controlled and adjusted to 
operate at a relatively fast speed (over 4000Hz). Therefore, we were able to transmit 
messages at a faster speed than other LEDs methods were able to achieve. This rate allowed 
the exfiltration of an encryption key of 4096 bits in a matter of minutes (and even seconds), 
depending on the receiver.  
 Visibility. When the HDD LED blinks for short period of time, humans may not be able to 
perceive its activity [17]. Moreover, at high speeds (e.g., above 400Hz), the LED flickering 
is invisible to humans, making the channel more covert. 
 Availability. Our method does not require any special hardware. It works with any 
computer that has an HDD activity LED. This component is found on most desktop PCs, 
laptops, and servers today. 
 Privilege level. Activating the HDD LED can be initiated from an ordinary user-level 
code, and does not required special component in the OS kernel.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present related work. Section III 
describes the adversarial attack model. Section IV provides technical background. Data 
modulation and transmission are discussed in Section V. Section VI presents the evaluation and 
results. Countermeasures are discussed in Section VII, and we present our conclusions in 
Section VIII. 
 II. RELATED WORK 
Leaking data from air-gapped computers via covert channels has been the subject of research 
for the past twenty years. Air-gap covert channels can be categorized as electromagnetic, 
acoustic, thermal, and optical channels. In electromagnetic methods, the attacker modulates 
data over of the electromagnetic signals generated by various components within the computer.  
A. Electromagnetic 
Back in 1998, Kuhn and Anderson [10] introduced the 'Soft Tempest' attack which involved 
hidden data transmission using electromagnetic emanations from a video cable. AirHopper [9], 
introduced in 2014, is a type of malware aimed at leaking data from air-gapped computers to a 
nearby mobile phone by generating FM radio signals from the video card. GSMem malware 
[13], presented in 2105, enables leaking data at cellular frequencies via electromagnetic 
emission, generated by the computer RAM bus. More recently, researchers presented USBee 
and Funthenna [18] which exploits the electromagnetic interference generated by the USB and 
GPIO buses. Matyunin et al use the magnetic field sensors of mobile devices as a covert channel 
[19]. Other electromagnetic and magnetic covert channels are discussed in [20]. 
B. Sonic/ultrasonic 
Near ultrasonic methods for air-gap covert channels are discussed in a number of academic 
works. Hanspach and Goetz [21] present a method for near ultrasonic covert networking using 
speakers and microphones in laptops. The concept of communicating over inaudible sounds has 
been comprehensively examined by Lee et al [22] and has also been extended for different 
scenarios using laptops and mobile phones [23] . Guri et al introduced Fansmitter [24] and 
Disfiltration [25], new methods enabling acoustic data exfiltration from computers without 
speakers or audio hardware. The proposed methods utilized computer fans and hard drives to 
generate acoustic signals. 
C. Thermal 
BitWhisper [26] is a unique air-gap covert channel, allowing bidirectional covert 
communication between adjacent air-gapped computers, using the computers’ heat emissions 
and the built-in thermal sensors of the computers’ motherboards.   
D. Optical  
In the optical domain, Loughry and Umphress [27] and Sepetnitsky and Guri [28] discuss the 
risks of intentional information leakage through optical signals sent from the keyboard and 
screen LEDs. They implemented malware that control the keyboard and screen power LEDs to 
transfer data to a remote camera. The main drawback of these methods is that they are less 
covert: since the keyboard and screen LEDs don’t blink typically, users can easily detect this 
type of communication. Shamir et al demonstrated how to establish a covert channel with a 
malware over the air-gap using a blinking laser and standard all-in-one-printer [29]. However, 
this method is also not covert and its success relies upon user absence. More recently, Lopes 
and Arana [30] presented a novel approach for air-gap data exfiltration using a malicious 
storage device which transmits data through blinking infrared LEDs. In this way, an attacker 
can leak sensitive data stored on the device, such as credentials and cryptographic keys, at a 
speed of 15 bit/s. The computer need not be infected with a malware, but this approach does 
require the attacker find a way to insert the compromised hardware implanted with infrared 
LEDs into the organization. Brasspup [31] demonstrated how to conceal secret images in a 
modified LCD screen. His method required removing the polarization filter of the LCD screen 
which makes it less practical for real world attacks. VisiSploit [32] is another optical covert 
channel in which data is leaked from the LCD screen to a remote camera via a so-called 
'invisible image.' With this method, a remote camera can reconstruct an invisible QR code 
projected on the computer screen.  
Table 1 summarizes the different types of existing air-gap covert channels and presents their 
maximum bandwidth and effective distance. 
      
Table 1. Different type of air-gap covert channels and distances 
Method Examples Max bandwidth Effective Distance 
Electromagnetic AirHopper [9] 
GSMem [13] 
USBee  
Funthenna [11] 
480 bit/s 
1 to 1000 bit/s 
4800 bit/s 
~5-10 meters 
Acoustic [15] [14] [22] [23] [33] 
Fan noise (Fansmitter) [24]  
Hard disk noise (DiskFiltration) [25] 
<100 bit/s 
900 bit/h 
10K bit/h 
~15 meters 
Thermal BitWhisper  1-8 bit/h 40 cm 
Optical (LEDs) (unmodified) Keyboard LEDs  [27]  
Screen LEDs [28] 
Implanted infrared LEDs [30] 
150 bit/s 
20 bit/s 
15 bit/s 
Line of sight 
 Hard drive LED (this paper) 4000 bit/s Line of sight 
 
The method presented in this paper has two main advantages compared to other LED based 
methods: its covertness and its speed. The state of keyboard and screen power LEDs does 
change frequently, and it is likely that any blinking caused by tampering with this channel will 
be obvious to observers. On the other hand, the HDD activity LED blinks frequently (due to 
OS background operations), and hence the effects of communication via this channel (changes 
in the blinking patter) will not arouse attention. The exfiltration speed we achieved with the 
HDD LED is up to 4000 bit/s, much higher than existing air-gap LED methods. 
 
III. ADVERSARIAL ATTACK MODEL 
The attack model consists of two phases: (1) infecting the target computer with a malware, and 
(2) receiving and decoding the signals that were leaked through the HDD LED. 
Infection. As demonstrated in recent years, infecting a computer within a secure network can 
be accomplished. Attackers may employ supply chain attacks, use social engineering 
techniques, or launch hardware with preinstalled malware to obtain a foothold in the target 
machine [34] [35] [36]. The malware then gathers sensitive information from the user's 
computer (e.g., keystrokes, password, encryption keys, and documents). Eventually it starts 
transmitting the binary data through the blinking HDD LED using a selected encoding scheme. 
Reception and Decoding. The attack model also requires a digital camera or optical sensor 
which has a line of sight with the compromised computer's front panel. We identify two 
scenarios in which this threat model is relevant: (1) the 'malicious insider' [37] (also known as 
the 'evil maid' [38] attack), in which a person carrying a hidden camera can obtain a line of 
sight with the compromised computer, and (2) a scenario involving a type of remote camera or 
optical sensor pointed at the compromised computer [39]. 
There are several types of equipment that can play the role of the receiver in this attack model. 
 Local hidden camera. A hidden camera that has a line of sight to the front panel of the 
transmitting computer. 
 High resolution remote camera. A high resolution camera (or other type of optical sensor) 
which is located outside the building, but positioned so it has a line of sight with front panel 
of the transmitting computer. 
 Drone camera. A camera installed on a versatile drone which is flown to a location which 
has a line of sight with the front panel of the transmitting computer, e.g., near the window. 
This type of receiver is relevant for leaking a small amount of data (e.g., leaking encryption 
keys).  
 Camera carried by malicious insider. A person that stands in close proximity to the 
computer, and can position him/herself so as to have a line of sight with the front panel of 
the transmitting computer, carrying a smartphone or wearable video camera (e.g., hidden 
camera). 
 Compromised security camera. A security camera positioned in a location where it has a 
line of sight with the front panel of the transmitting computer. A comprehensive analysis 
of the threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks on video surveillance, closed-circuit TV, and IP 
camera systems was conducted by Costin in [39]. 
 Optical sensors. An optical sensor capable of sensing the light emitted from the HDD 
LED. Such sensors are used extensively in VLC (visible light communication) and LED to 
LED communication [40]. Notably, optical sensors are capable of sampling LED signals at 
high rates, enabling data reception at a higher bandwidth than a typical video camera.  
 
 
Figure 1. Example of the attack. A leaking HDD LED (the red LED at the center of the image) as captured 
by a hidden video camera eight meters away from the transmitting computer.   
 
An example of the covert channel is provided in Figure 1 in which sensitive data is encoded in 
binary form and covertly transmitted over a stream of HDD LED signals. A hidden video 
camera films the activity in the room, including the LED signals. The attacker can then decode 
the signals and reconstruct the modulated data. 
 
IV. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
LED (light emitting diode) is a two-lead semiconductor light source that illuminates when an 
electrical charge passes through it. LEDs are used as activity indicators in a wide range of 
electronic devices. In addition, LEDs of different size and colors are also used in various 
applications such as advertising, home lighting, automotive industry and traffic signals. The 
wavelength of the emitted light (which is indicated by its color) is determined by the material 
used in the semiconducting element within the LED. Generally, aluminum gallium indium 
phosphide (AlGaInP) is used in red, orange, and yellow LEDs, and indium gallium nitride 
(InGaN) is used in green, blue, and white LEDs.   
LED indicators are commonly used in desktop and laptop computers and their peripheral 
hardware components. Computer LEDs include the power and keyboard LEDs. Many 
motherboards have an internal onboard power LED that indicates whether there are hardware 
errors. 
A. Hard drive activity LED 
The HDD activity indicator is a small LED that blinks whenever the hard drive is active (being 
read from or written to). A schematic flow of the HDD activity LED’s operation is provided in 
Figure 2. Technically, internal hard disk drives in desktop and laptop computers are connected 
to the motherboard via a SATA/IDE interface or another type of mass storage device interface 
(Figure 2-1). The motherboard hard drive controller sends signals via the HDD activity header 
pins over the standard 2-pin HDD LED extension cable (Figure 2-2). These signals cause an 
LED on the front of a computer to flash when the drive is active. The signals are sent to the 
LED whenever 'read' or 'write' operations have been issued to the HDD. Some large computer 
cases (e.g., server PCs) have multiple hard disk activity LEDs, to allow for separate connection 
of a number of drives. External hard drives and flash drives are usually equipped with an 
activity LED as well. In these cases, the LED is connected to the embedded controller of the 
flash drive. 
 
Figure 2. Schematic flow of the HDD activity LED operation. 
 
On a desktop PC the HDD LED is located on the front panel of the computer. On a laptop the 
HDD LED is usually located on the front control bar (located above the keyboard) or on the 
front edge of the computer. The activity LED of an external HDD is usually located on the front 
of its case. The LED light may be any color, depending on the type of computer, but it is usually 
white, red, green, yellow, or blue. 
B. HDD LED circuit hardware 
The HDD activity LED is connected to the motherboard circuit using a 2-pin extension cable. 
To activate the component two parameters are needed: forward voltage of at least 2V, and 
forward current of 20-130mA, depending on type of LED. Digital output ports cannot provide 
an adequate amount of current needed to operate the LED, and thus an extra electronic circuit, 
called an LED driver, is needed to fulfill the working requirements. Figure 3 presents the two 
driver circuits commonly used in motherboards. The circuit in Figure 3(a) is based on an NPN 
transistor connected in common emitter configuration. The circuit in Figure 3(b) based on an 
operational amplifier. Both circuits can provide the amount of current needed to operate the 
LED.     
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Figure 3. The two common motherboard LED driver circuits. (a) A common emitter configuration with self-
biasing implementation. (b) Operational amplifier based implementation. 
 
The circuit presented in Figure 3(a) is less expensive than the circuit in Figure 3(b), and it has 
more limited current amplification (150-550). The more expensive circuit in Figure 3(b) is 
based on an operational amplifier and has a comparator configuration with open loop 
amplification of 106, allowing faster responsivity to the input signal; in addition it has only two 
voltage levels (5v and 0v). This circuit also has better immunization to the input. 
 
V. DATA TRANSMISSION 
In this section we present the data transmission. We discuss the basic signal generation and 
describe different modulation methods, along with their implementation details.  
A. Signal generation 
In our method, the data carrier is the state of the HDD LED. The basic signal is generated by 
turning the LED on and off. Technically, the HDD LED is controlled directly by the 
motherboard chipset. We found that there is no reliable generic API that can be used to enable 
a software to request the motherboard to turn on the HDD indicator LED. In order to generate 
the signal, we can indirectly control the LED by performing specific HDD 'read' or 'write' 
operations. These operations cause the motherboard to turn on the HDD LED for a specified 
amount of time, depending on the size of the buffer being read or written to the storage device. 
Table 2 lists the OS level operations and the corresponding LED states, denoted as LED-ON 
and LED-OFF. As can be seen, reading or writing a buffer size ࡿ causes the HDD LED to be 
turned on for the time period of  ௢ܶ௡. Sleeping for time ௢ܶ௙௙ causes the HDD LED to be turned 
off for a period of ௢ܶ௙௙. 
Table 2. Signal time  
OS operation HDD-LED state 
read/write (ࡿ) LED-ON for time ܶ݋݊ (ܵ) 
sleep (ࢀ࢕ࢌࢌ) LED-OFF for time ܶ݋݂݂ 
 B. Data encoding 
The topic of visible light communication has been widely studied in the last decade. In 
particular, various modulations and encoding schemes have been proposed for LED to LED 
communication [40] [41] [42]. For our purposes, we present three basic encoding schemes 
which enable the transmission of digital data over the HDD LED: (1) on-off keying (OOK), (2) 
Manchester encoding, and (3) Binary Frequency Shift Keying (B-FSK).  
1) On-off keying (OOK) 
This is the simplest form of the more general amplitude-shift keying (ASK) modulation. The 
presence of a signal for a certain duration encodes a logical one ("1"), while its absence for the 
same duration encodes a logical zero ("0"). In our case, LED-ON for a duration ௢ܶ௡ encodes 
"1" and LED-OFF for duration of ௢ܶ௙௙ encodes "0". Note that in the simple case ௢ܶ௡ = ௢ܶ௙௙ . 
2) Manchester encoding 
In Manchester encoding each logical bit is sent using two physical bits. The sequence of 
physical bits "01" (LED-OFF, LED-ON) encodes a logical "0" and the sequence of physical 
bits "10" (LED-ON, LED-OFF) encodes a logical "1". Manchester encoding solves the LED 
flickering problem by sending an equal number of ones and zeroes. Manchester encoding’s 
transfer rate is half of that of OOK, since it uses two physical bits for each logical bit. This type 
of encoding is considered more reliable because of the redundancy of each transmitted bit; 
therefore it is heavily used in communication. 
3) Binary Frequency Shift Keying (B-FSK) 
In this encoding scheme both a logical "1" and "0" are encoded by LED-ON. A logical "1" is 
encoded by the LED-ON state for time duration of ௢ܶ௡(ܵଵ), and a logical "0" is encoded by the 
LED-ON state for time duration of ௢ܶ௡(ܵ଴). Each logical bit is followed by a guard interval 
(LED-OFF) for a time interval of ௢ܶ௙௙. 
C. Bit framing 
We transmit the binary data in frames. The frames have two roles: (1) providing periodic 
synchronization signals to the receiver, and (2) providing a basic error check mechanism for 
each sent packet of bytes. 
We used two types of bit framing: (1) fixed length framing, and (2) variable length framing. 
Table 3. Fixed length framing 
8 bits 256 bits 16 bits 
Preamble (10101010) Payload  CRC 
 
Table 4. Variable length framing 
8 bits 16 bits n bits 16 bits 
Preamble (10101010) Payload size (n) Payload  CRC 
 
In fixed length framing (Table 3) the binary data is transmitted in small, fixed size packets. 
Each packet is composed of a preamble (8 bits), a payload (256 bits), and a checksum (16 bits). 
The preamble consists of a sequence of eight alternating bits ('10101010') and is used by the 
receiver to periodically determine the channel timing ( ௢ܶ௡ and ௢ܶ௙௙). In addition, the preamble 
header allows the receiver to identify the beginning of a transmission and calibrate other 
parameters, such as the intensity and color of the transmitting LED. The payload is a chunk of 
256 bits to be transmitted. We used a 16-bit CRC (cyclic redundancy check) for error detection. 
The CRC is computed on the payload and added to the end of the frame. The receiver calculates 
the CRC for the received payload, and if it differs from the received CRC, an error is detected. 
In variable length framing (Table 4) the binary data is transmitted in packets with varying 
length. The preamble is followed by 16 bits which determine the payload size. The payload size 
may differ between packets. Finally, the 16-bit CRC of the payload is added to the end of the 
frame.  
Note that fixed length bit framing is more suitable for cases in which a small amount of fixed 
sized data is about to be transmitted (e.g., encryption keys and passwords). With a larger amount 
of data (e.g., files), variable length framing may be better, because it can transmit the entire 
amount of data in fewer packets, while saving the overhead of the frame headers. However, in 
some circumstances larger frames are more wasteful, since a single bit error may corrupt the 
whole frame. 
D. Implementation 
We implemented a prototype of the transmitter for the Linux OS. We choose to use the read 
operation to turn on the HDD activity LED, because it leaves no traces on the file system. We 
executed a C program which uses the direct addressing system calls and the fseek(), fopen(), 
and fread() system calls [43] [44]. We also implemented a shell script version of the transmitter 
using the Linux dd command-line utility [45]. This is a low level utility of Linux which can 
perform a wide range of HDD operations (e.g., read or copy) at the file or block level. A 
pseudocode for on-off keying transmission is provided in algorithm 1. 
 
Algorithm 1    HDDLED_TransmitBit 
1: procedure transmitBits(bits, T0, ReadSize) 
2:  sync(); //drop cache 
3:  hddDev = open(/dev/sda) 
4:  offset = 0 
5:  offsetIncrement = BLOCK_SIZE; 
6:  seek(hddDev, offset); 
7:  for(b in bits) 
8:       if (b='0') then  
9:          sleep (T0); 
10:    if (b='1') then  
11:         seek(hddDev, offset); 
12:         read(hddDev, ReadSize); 
13:         offset += offsetIncrement  
14:  end for 
15:  return; 
 
The procedure HDDLED_TransmitBit takes three parameters: the stream of bits to transmit (bits), 
time ௢ܶ௙௙ (T0), and the size of the buffer for the read operation (ReadSize), which determines 
௢ܶ௡(ܵ). Initially, the cache is cleared (line 2), and then we open the main hard drive for reading 
(line 3). Since the OS performs HDD reads in small size blocks (BLOCK_SIZE), we must 
ensure that two consecutive reads are taken on different blocks in the HDD; otherwise, the 
second read operation will not generate HDD access (LED activity), because the block is 
already in the cache. For each bit in the bit stream, if the bit is '0' we do nothing for time T0 
(line 8-9). If the bit is '1' then a read operation is performed, and we advance to the next block 
(line 11-13). 
E. Caching avoidance 
In order to efficiently modulate data over the LED signal, we need to precisely control the 
duration of the read operations. In particular, we need to be able to perform the read operation 
at a given time without delay. Modern OSs employ disk and file I/O caching mechanisms in 
their kernel or device drivers. Such caching can cause timing delays and inconsistencies in the 
generation of LED signals. For efficient and error-free signal generation, we must avoid any 
type of caching during the read operation. Before the transmissions, we turned off the disk 
caching using the /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches, in order to instruct the kernel to free the 
pagecache, dentries, and inodes. We also turned off the HDD write-back cache mechanism, 
using the hdparm command line tool [46]. In the shell script, we used the dd tool with 'direct' 
flag (use direct I/O for data), and 'sync' flag (use synchronized I/O for data). 
 
VI. EVALUATION 
In this section we present the evaluation of the transmitter and its characteristics. Note that the 
concept of LED communication was the subject of a considerable amount of research in recent 
years. Today it is possible to transmit signals over LEDs at a rate of 500 Mbit/s [42] [47]. Other 
research shows that it is possible to decode LED signals from more than 30 meters away [27]. 
Our evaluation focuses on the characteristics of the HDD LED and its rate. In our evaluation, 
we adapt the approach commonly used in visible light communication (VLC), which assumes 
a line of sight between the light source and the camera [27] [41]. 
The experimental setup consists of three off the shelf standard desktop PCs, each with a 
different type of HDD LED (Table 5). Note that although most HDD indication LEDs are red, 
many vendors today are using different colors. For the evaluation we used red, blue, and white 
types of HDD LEDs. 
Table 5. PCs used in our experimental setup with red, blue, and white HDD indicator LEDs 
# Case type LED  Motherboard Hard Drive 
PC-1 Infinity  Red Gigabyte H87M-
D3H 
- WD Blue 1TB Desktop Hard Disk 
Drive - 7200 RPM SATA 6Gb/s 
64MB Cache 3.5" 
- Kingston HyperX Savage SSD, 
240GB 
PC-2 Gigabyte Blue Gigabyte H77-D3H Seagate Desktop HDD 1TB 64MB 
Cache SATA 6.0Gb/s 3.5"  
PC-3 Dell Optiplex 
9020 
White Intel Q87(LYNX 
POINT) 
WD Blue 1TB Desktop Hard Disk 
Drive - 7200 RPM SATA 6Gb/s 
64MB Cache 3.5"" 
 
The main PC has an Infinity case with a Gigabyte H87M-D3H motherboard with Intel® H87 
chipsets. We tested two hard drives. The first is the WD Blue 1TB Desktop Hard Disk Drive - 
7200 RPM SATA 6Gb/s 64MB Cache 3.5 Inch. Based on a benchmark that we conducted in 
our lab, this HDD has a read rate of 144.2 MB/s and an access time of 14.7ms. We also tested 
the 240GB Kingston HyperX Savage solid state drive (SSD). A small circular red HDD 
indicator LED is located on the front of the computer chassis. This LED is connected to two 
pins in the motherboard (HD LED pins), which supply its voltage. In terms of software we used 
the user-level transmitting program described in the Implementation sub-section. This program 
receives the channel parameters (LED-ON and LED-OFF times) and the array of bits to 
transmit. 
A. LED measurement setup 
To evaluate the HDD LED at high speeds we designed a measurement setup based on 
photodiode light sensors.  
Setup. Very simply, a photodiode is a semiconductor that converts light into electrical current. 
The measurement setup is shown in Figure 4. The photodiode was connected to the charge 
configuration amplifier AD549 [48] (with 0.11 fA current noise density) and the data 
acquisition system. Data was collected with the NI cDAQ measurement system with a 16-bit 
ADC NI9223 measurement card [49] which is capable of 200K samples per second. The system 
was driven by the LabVIEW dataflow visual programming language.  
Channel 1
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Figure 4. The light measurement experimental setup, based on a photodiode and NI acquisition system with 
high speed sampling rate. 
 
Sensors. We used two type of photodiodes: (1) SIEMENS photodiode SFH-2030 (Figure 5(a)), 
a device which is suitable for sensing light at wavelengths of 400-1100 nm, dark current of 
1nA, 55nsec of current rise and fall time, and (2) Thorlabs PDA100A Si Switchable Gain 
Detector [50] (Figure 5(b)), suitable for sensing light at wavelengths of 320-1100 nm, 2.4 MHz 
BW, 0.973 - 27 pW/Hz1/2 with a built-in amplifier.  
   
Figure 5. (a) SIEMENS photodiode SFH-2030, and (b) Thorlabs PDA100A sensor. 
 
The two sensors fit into different attack models. The SIEMENS photodiode circuit is a simple, 
small sensor that could be secretly hidden in the room in which the transmitter computer is 
located. The Thorlabs PDA100A is a larger device with a built-in optimized amplifier and an 
option to connect an external lens used to magnify and focus the light signal. Such a larger 
sensor may be located remotely (e.g., outside the window), carried by human, or integrated on 
a flying drone. 
B. The transmitter  
As mentioned, the HDD activity LED cannot be controlled directly by software. Instead, we 
perform the 'read' operation from the OS, which in turn causes the HDD controller on the 
motherboard to turn on the HDD indication LED. We examine the correlation between ܵ and 
௢ܶ௡(ܵ), denoting the number of bytes we read as ܵ and the time the LED was on as ௢ܶ௡(ܵ). This 
information is important, because it enables us to configure the parameters of the transmitting 
software. We also evaluate the channel boundaries to determine the maximum frequency on 
which the HDD LED can operate and the maximum bandwidth. 
Table 6. LED-ON measurements 
Read volume (ࡿ) LED-ON Time (ࢀ࢕࢔(ࡿ))  Bit/s 
60000000 (60MB) 630 ms 1.6 bit/s 
15120000 (15MB) 250 msec 4 bps bit/s 
80000000 (8MB) 60 msec 16 bit/s 
5120000 (5MB) 32 msec 30 bit/s 
1280000 (1.2MB) 5 msec 180 bit/s 
800000 (800KB) 3.6 msec 277 bit/s 
600000 (600KB) 3.2 msec 312 bit/s 
512000 (512KB) 2 msec 500 bit/s 
256000 (256KB) 1.2 msec 833 bit/s 
<4KB 0.18 msec 4000 bit/s 
 
We configured the transmitter to perform the 'read' operation with varying the number of bytes 
(ܵ). Using the LED measurement setup described above, we measured the corresponding LED-
ON time ( ௢ܶ௡(ܵ)). The photodiodes were positioned directly in front of the HDD LED, and 
located a distance from zero to several meters away. Table 6 contains the main values of  ܵ and 
the corresponding ௢ܶ௡(ܵ). 
 
 
Figure 6. PC-1 measurements with pulse width of (a) 680 msec (ࡿ = ૟૙ࡹ ), (b) 32 msec (ࡿ = ૞ࡹ࡮), (c) 3.6 
msec (ࡿ = ૙. ૡࡹ࡮), and (d) 0.18 msec  (ࡿ =  ૝ࡷ). 
 
Figure 6 shows the waveforms of binary '101010…' (encoded in OOK) transmitted at a rate of 
1.6 bit/s, 30 bit/s, 277 bit/s, and 4000 bit/s, respectively. In this case, the transmitter is the PC-
1 (red LED), and the receiver is the SIEMENS photodiode. Note that our LED-ON 
measurement includes a duty cycle of 50%. 
 
Figure 7. Measurements for (a) PC-1 (red LED), (b) PC-2 (blue LED), and (c) PC-3 (white LED) 
  
Figure 7 provides measurements for transmissions made from PC-1 (red LED), PC-2 (blue 
LED), and PC-3 (white LED). In this experiment we use the PDA100A sensor with ܵ = 4ܭ. 
PC-1 has a pulse width of 0.18 msec and an amplitude 5.3V. PC-2 shows a pulse width of 0.12 
msec and an amplitude of 0.71V. PC-3 shows a pulse width of 0.1 msec and an amplitude of 
0.18V. The amplitude represents the amount of charge converted to voltage with the electrical 
current amplifier. As can be seen, the blue LEDs produce the strongest optic signals.  
Table 7 shows the maximum bandwidth for the various receivers and attack models. The main 
factor in determining the maximum bandwidth in video cameras is the number of frames per 
second (FPS). For video cameras, we have identified a setting of two frames per bit as the 
optimal setting needed to achieve successful detection of the LED-ON timing.  
Table 7. Maximum bandwidth of different receivers 
Tested 
Camera/Sensor 
Model Resolution Max bandwidth  
Entry-level 
DSLR  
Nikon D7100. 
lens: Nikon18-140mm 
F3.5-5.6 ED VR 
1920x1080 (video) 
1280x720 (60 fps 
video) 
15 bit/s 
High-end 
security camera 
SNCEB600 
Network 720p/30fps HD 
Fixed Camera -  
1280 x 1024   15 bit/s 
Extreme camera GoPro Hero5 4K - WVGA  100-120 bit/s 
Webcam (HD) Microsoft LifeCam   1280x720 (video) 15 bit/s 
Smartphone 
camera 
Samsung Galaxy S6    1920x1080 (video) 15-60 bit/s 
a
b
c
Wearable 
camera  
Google Glass Explorer 
Edition 
2528x1856 
1280x 720 (video) 
15 bit/s 
Photodiode 
sensor 
e.g.,  
SIEMENS photodiode 
SFH-2030 / 
Thorlabs PDA100A 
sensor  
- <4000 bit/s 
 
C. Distances 
It is known that the activity of computer LEDs can be detected from more than 30 meters away 
[27]. In fact, in LED to LED communication, given a line of sight with the transmitter it is 
possible to detect the LED transmission from even farther away [41]. The quality of the optical 
LED signal (as received by the camera) is affected by the receiver’s location (its distance away, 
angle, and position), the ambient light, LED wavelength, and other factors. Comprehensive 
analysis of optical signals is a complex task which goes beyond the scope of this paper. Notably, 
the environmental conditions can directly influence the effective distance. For example, during 
the night we were able identify the LED signals from outside the building, at a distance of 20 
meters away. In addition, using optical zoom lenses it is possible to extend the range further. 
Figure 8 shows the signals transmitted from PC-1 as measured in daylight by an optical sensor 
within the room at distances of three, four, and five meters away. The amplitudes represents the 
amount of charge converted to voltage with the current amplifier. 
 
Figure 8. Signals transmitted from PC-1 as measured in daylight by an optical sensor within the room at 
distances of (a) three, (b) four, and (c) five meters away. The amplitude represents the amount of charge 
converted to voltage with the current amplifier. 
 
VII. COUNTERMEASURES 
Countermeasures for emanation-based data leakage, can be classified into procedural and 
technological countermeasures. Procedural countermeasures may include organizational 
a
b
c
a 
practices aimed to restrict the accessibility of sensitive computers by placing them in secured 
rooms where only authorized staff may access them; typically, all types of cameras are banned 
from such secured rooms. Some of the NATO standards concerning TEMPEST have been 
leaked or released [51] [52], and these standards define that certified equipment is classified by 
zones which refer to the perimeter that needs to be controlled to prevent signal leakage [53]. In 
these areas, the presence of surveillance cameras may serve as a deterrence measure. However, 
as mentioned previously in the attack model, the surveillance camera itself may be 
compromised by a malware [54] [39]. A less sophisticated countermeasure against LED attacks 
is to disconnect the HDD indication LED or cover it with black tape [27]. Equipment shielding 
is another commonly recommended by TEMPEST standards. In the case of optical emanation, 
a special window film that prevents optical eavesdropping may be installed [55]; note that this 
type of countermeasure doesn't protect against cameras located within the building. 
Technological countermeasures may include the detection of the presence of malware that 
triggers the HDD activity LED. However, practical implementation of such countermeasures 
appears to be nontrivial, since the read operation used for the LED control is commonly used 
by many processes running in the computer. Another possible countermeasure is video 
monitoring the computer’s front panel in order to detect hidden signaling patterns. Again, 
practical implementation is nontrivial, because the HDD LED routinely blinks frequently due 
to read and write operations triggered by benign processes. Another interesting solution is to 
execute a background process that frequently invokes random read and write operations; that 
way, the signal generated by the malicious process will get mixed up with a random noise, 
limiting the attack’s effectiveness. The list of countermeasures is summarized in Table 8. 
Table 8. List of countermeasures 
Type Countermeasure Cost 
Procedural Camera banning Low 
Procedural LED covering Low 
Procedural LED disconnecting Low 
Procedural Window shielding High 
Technological LED activity monitoring (software) Low 
Technological LED activity monitoring (camera) High 
Technological Signal jamming (software) Low 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
We present a new method to leak data from air-gapped computers. Our method uses the HDD 
activity LED which is present in most PC workstations, laptops, and servers today. We show 
how the malware can indirectly control the status of the LED, turning it on and off for a 
specified amount of time, by invoking hard drive’s 'read' and 'write' operations. Our method is 
unique in two respects: it is covert and fast. It is covert, because the HDD activity LED routinely 
blinks frequently; hence, additional blinks caused by the attack may raise no suspicions. In 
terms of speed, our evaluation shows that the LED is capable of almost 6000 blinks per second, 
which enables a transmission rate of up to 4000 bit/s. This is 10 times faster than other air-gap 
covert channels relying on optical emissions. We examine the physical characteristics of HDD 
LEDs of different colors (red, blue, and white) and tested remote cameras, extreme cameras, 
security cameras, smartphone cameras, drone cameras, and optical sensors. Our results show 
that it is feasible to use this optical channel to efficiently leak different types of data (passwords, 
encryption keys, and files) from an air-gapped computer, via the HDD indication LED. 
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